Reed v. Forrer : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Reed v. Forrer : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George E. Mangan, James R. Hall; attorneys for appellants.
R. Clark Arnold; Reynolds & Arnold; attorneys for respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Stuart Reed v. Henry H. Forrer, No. 914572.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3848
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
M 
DOCKET NO. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIEF 
i&nt 
HENRY H. FORRER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
STUART REED, RUSSELL REED, 
DONALD REED, FRANKLIN REED, 
MARAGRET REED, CORDIE MAE 
REED and LAWANNA KAY REED, 
Defendants-Counter-
Plaintiffs and Res-
pondents , 
vs. 
HENRY H. FORRER, ROBERT 
SATHER, EZILDA HENDRICKS, 
CHARLES HENDRICKS, ROGER 
L. ROBERSON and ETHEL 
LaVERNIA ROBERSON, 
Counter-Defendants 
and Appellants. 
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
RT OF THE STATE OF UTAt| ' l! j(V| 1977 
vm\'X\ YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben C.'sr'j Ls\y 5chool 
Case No. 14572 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
FI 
Appeal from Judgment of the fourth District Court 
Uintah County, State of Utah 
he Honorable George E. BJallif, Judge 
SEP 29 1976 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
GEORGE E. MANGAN 
P.O. Box 246 
Roosevelt, Utah 
Attorney for 
JAMES R. HALL 
P.O. Box 395 
Roosevelt, Utah 
Attorney for 
R. CLARK ARNOLD 
922 K&arns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Franklin Reed, 
Margaret Reed, Cordie Mae 
Reed and Lawanna Kay Reed. 
Defendants-Counter-Plaintiffs 
ana Respondents 
84066 
Counter-Defendants and Appellants 
84066 
Counter-Defendant and Appellant Robert Sather 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY H. FORRER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
STUART REED, RUSSELL REEDf 
DONALD REED, FRANKLIN REED, 
MARAGRET REED, CORDIE MAE 
REED and LAWANNA KAY REED, 
Defendants-Counter-
Plaintiffs and Res-
pondents , 
vs. 
HENRY H. FORRER, ROBERT 
SATHER, EZILDA HENDRICKS, 
CHARLES HENDRICKS, ROGER 
L. ROBERSON and ETHEL 
LaVERNIA ROBERSON, 
Counter-Defendants 
and Appellants. 
Case No. 14572 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth District Court 
Uintah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge 
R. CLARlt ARNOLD 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Franklin Reed, 
Margaret Reed, Cordie Mae 
Reed and Lawanna Kay Reed. 
Defendants-Counter-Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
GEORGE E. MANGAN 
P.O. Box 246 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Attorney for Counter-Defendants and Appellants 
JAMES R. HALL 
P.O. Box 395 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Attorney for Counter-Defendant and Appellant Robert Sather 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TITLE PAGE i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED iii-iv 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 3 
POINT I, THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AWARDING 
THE RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS AND ORDERING FORE-
CLOSURE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS 
PROPER AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED , 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUIETING 
TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN 
APPELLANT HENRY H. FORRER AND THIS 
COURT SHOULD REVERSE THAT DECISION 
AND AWARDED THE OWNERSHIP OF SAID 
PROPERTY TO RESPONDENTS 
POINT III, RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO BE 
AWARDED REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
AS PART OF THEIR JUDGMENT AND THIS 
COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND WITH 
INSTRUCTION TO DETERMINE AND AWARD 
SAME 
10 
CONCLUSION 
16 
17 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 18 
I l l 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CtTTED 
CASES CITED 
Andrus v. Blazzardf 23 U. 233, 63 P. 888 (190|1) 11 
Baker v. Goodman, 57 U. 349, 194 P. 117 ( ) 9 
Burnham, et.al. v. Eschler, 116 U. 61, 208 P.,2d 96 (1949) 13 
Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan, 344 Pa. 556, 25 A.2d 728, 
729 ( ) , 14 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 U.2d 420, 413 P.2d 
807 (1966) , 13 
Crompton v. Jenson, 78 U. 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931) 5 
De Graffenried v. Iowa Land & Title Co., 20 Okla. 687, 95 P. 
624 (1908) , 4 
Dignan v. Nelson, 26 U. 186, 72 P. 936 (1903) 6 
Ezelda[sic] Reed Hendricks v. Robert Sather, dba Sather Jew-
elry and Richard Murray, Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Uintah County, Civil No. 5257 5, 15 
F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 U.2d 80, 104 P.2d 
670 ( ) 16 
Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 U. 236, 177 P. 763 (1918) 11,12 
In the matter of the Guardianship of the estates and persons 
of Louis Russell Reed, Donald LeRoy Reed, Franklin Tarry 
Reed, Margaret Sue Reed, Cordie Mae Reed and Lawanna Kay 
Reed, Minors, Fourth Judicial District Court, Uintah 
County, Probate No. 1458 5,10,13, 
14 
In re Vorhees' Estate, 12 U.2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961) 8 
Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 U. 108, 66 P. 773 ( ) 6 , 
Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915) 16 
Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha v. Bragg„ 67 U. 60, 245 
P. 966 (1925) , 11 
U.S. v. Frisbee, 57F.Supp. 299 (D.C. Mont. 1944) 4 
U.S. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 60 F.Supp. 411 (1945), 
aff'd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 138 F.2d 730, 
cert. den. 331 U.S. 842 , 4 
IV 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Cont.) 
STATUTES CITED 
§57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.) 12 
§74-13-33, Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.) 11 
§78-12-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.) 5,15 
§78-12-21, Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.) 6 
§78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.) 5 
§78-37-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.) 16 
Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
86 A.L.R.2d 965, Annotation: Limitations of Actions - Disa-
bilities 6 
39 AmJur2d §125, Guardian and Ward 11 
39 AmJur2d §217, Guardian and Ward. 11 
55 AmJur2d §106, §109, Mortgages 3 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY H. FORRER, 
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STUART REED, RUSSELL REED, 
DONALD REED, FRANKLIN REED, 
MARGARET REED, CORDIE MAE 
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Defendants-Counter-Plaintiffs 
and Respondents/ 
vs. 
HENRY H. FORRER, ROBERT 
SATHER, EZILDA HENDRICKS, 
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lants. 
Case No. 14572 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title in the plaintiff, Henry 
H. Forrer and his wife (hereafter the "Forrers") to a certain 
piece of real property located in Uintah County, State of Utah and 
described as follows (hereafter the "subject property"): 
TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M. 
Section 35: The East half of the Southeast 
quarter of the Northwest quarter; the West 
half of the Southwest quarter of the North-
east quarter. 
The defendants-counter-plaintiffs and respondents (hereafter the 
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"respondents") are the record holders of a mortgage on that pro-
perty and are seeking foreclosure of their mortgage. They also 
are seeking, in the alternative, a determination that title to 
said property properly lies with them by reason of an unrecorded 
quit-claim deed, executed by their mother, Ezilda Van Hendricks, 
and delivered to R. Earl Dillman, her attorney at that time. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court decreed that the plaintiff was the legal 
owner of the subject property but further decreed that the pro-
perty was subject to the respondents1 mortgage. The respondents 
were granted judgment on their counter-claim against the Ezilda 
Van Hendricks and Charles Hendricks in the amount of $15,750.00 
plus $25.60 court costs and interest at the rate of eight (8%) 
percent per annum from the date of judgment until paid. The 
subject property was ordered foreclosed to satisfy said judgment. 
The default of Stuart Reed, Russell Reed and Donald Reed was en-
tered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants are seeking reversal of the Trial Court's 
decision foreclosing the property. The respondents are seeking 
affirmation of that decision but reversal of the Trial Court's 
decision in not awarding the title to the property to respondents 
and in not awarding respondents their attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents agree with appellants that the Pre-Trial 
Stipulation entered into between the parties which contains, in-
ter alia, a statement of facts,governs the factual situation pre-
sented to the court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AWARDING TJHE RESPONDENTS 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE COUNTER-DEFENDANTS AND ORDERING 
THE FORECLOSURE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS PROPER 
AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
A. The appellants have failed^  to show that the 
trial court's decision was clearly erroneous and not supported 
by the evidence. The appellants failed to introduce evidence 
disputing the indebtedness to respondents and, in fact, stipu-
lated that such indebtedness did exist (Stip. p. 3).—' Appel-
lants further stipulated that the mortgage when created and 
recorded constituted a valid lien upon the siibject property 
(Stip. p. 3) and failed to introduce any evidence proving that 
the indebtedness had been repaid or otherwise satisfied. Not-
withstanding their stipulation to the contrary, appellants have 
maintained to both the trial court and in their brief herein 
(App. p. 3)=y that the mortgage was not valid. Patently, this 
position is untenable. 
Even if appellants were allowed to raise this 
issue, their argument is without merit. "As a rule, anything 
or any interest capable of passing by purchase or descent is 
capable of being encumbered by a mortgage." 55 AmJur2d §106, 
Mortgages. Even mortgages of property to be 4cquired in the 
future were validated in equity. Id., §109. In any event, the 
1/ The Pre-Trial Stipulation of the parties will hereafter be 
referred to in the text as lfStip. p. ." 
2/ Appellants1 brief herein will be referred to in the text as 
"App. p._." 
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title held by an Indian to restricted land is tantamount to fee 
ownership, with the exception that there are restrictions on 
3/ 
alienation.— It has been held that the initial selection of an 
allotment of land is the inception of title and the patent, 
4/ 
when issued, relates back to the allotment.— The appellants1 
argument that only recording in the County Recorder's office 
begins a chain of title is simply incorrect. Any competent title 
research must examine the status of the title from the U.S. gov-
ernment to insure that the patent was issued properly according 
to law and to insure that there are no restrictions or reservations 
applicable by law to the land in question.— Given the validity 
of Federal chains of title, and especially with Indian lands 
where ownership may be transferred prior to issuance of patent, 
any prudent purchaser will examine that Federal chain. Had the 
appellants done so in this case, they would have discovered the 
minority of the respondents and the trust nature of their seller 
to the respondents. 
B. Neither the doctrine of laches nor the running 
of a period of limitations operates to defeat the respondents' en-
forcement of their mortgage. Appellants place great reliance upon 
the expiration of a number of years from the creation of the mort-
gage to its foreclosure as supportive of the argument that fore-
closure should be denied. With regard to the equitable argument, 
3/ See, e.g., U.S. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 60 F.Supp. 411 (1945). 
afffd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 138 F.2d 730, cert. den. 331 U.S. 842. 
4V De Graffenried v. Iowa Land & Title Co., 20 Okla. 687, 95 P.624 (1908), 
5/ See, e.g.,U.S. v. Frisbee,57 F.Supp. 299 (D.C. Mont. 1944) where min-
eral rights were preserved in the Indian notwithstanding an apparent conveyance 
of them by issuance of a patent. See, also, 25 U.S.C. Sec. 311-328(right-of-ways). 
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however, it must be noted that appellants did not introduce evi-
dence, other than the passage of time, upon which the trial court 
could base a finding that the period of time was unreasonable. In 
fact, the record indicates that the trial court considered the 
minority of the respondents, the trust relationship and breaches 
thereof by their guardian and the trust source of the funds used 
to purchase the subject property by the mothelr in finding that 
the passage of time did not make it unreasonable to enforce the 
mortgage. In fact, the record shows that the mother brought suit 
subsequent to October 13, 1966, against Robert Sather to seek a 
quiet title to the subject property in her favor (Stip. p.2). 
While her suit was dismissed, this factor further supports a find-
ing that the respondents delay in foreclosing their mortgage was 
justified in as much as when that suit was filled, the four youngest 
children were still minors. The record amply supports the trial 
court's decision in this regard. 
In their argument regarding the statute of limita-
tions, appellants seem to confuse §78-12-18 lltah Code Annotated 
(1953 rev.ed.) [providing a three year period in which to sue for 
recovery of estates sold by a guardian] with §78-12-23 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 rev.ed.) [providing a six year period of limita-
tions and which section has been held to apply to mortgage fore-
closures. Crompton v. Jenson, 78 U. 55, 1 P2d 242(1931)]. With 
regard to the trial court's decision on the mortgage foreclosure, 
the latter period applies. Appellants contend that the appoint-
ment of the counter-defendant and mother of respondents as their 
guardian, on March 19, 1958, should begin the running of the per-
-6-
iod of limitations (App. p. 7ff). This argument clearly is con-
trary to Utah law [§78-12-21] which provides that a period of 
limitations does not begin running against one under a disability 
until that disability ends. Further, the general rule is that 
the appointment of a guardian does not have the effect of start-
ing periods of limitation running [see, 86 A.L.R.2d 965, Anno-
tation, Limitations of Actions - Disabilities]. In certain sit-
uations, the courts have started the period running when a guard-
6/ ian has been appointed— but in those cases the guardian or trustee 
could have asserted the action on behalf of the minors and was 
not an adverse party to the minors. To apply that exception to 
this case would be to require the guardian to sue herself; a most 
illogical and untenable position despite appellants argument that 
this should be required [App. p. 9]. The trial court did not 
accept this argument and for good reason: if this were the rule, 
a guardian could sell property to individuals who could buy with 
the knowledge that the statute would begin running from that point. 
Upon attaining majority, the minors would find their only recourse 
against thesir guardian, the statute having run against the purchaser. 
Adopting appellants1 argument on this point would eliminate the 
protection afforded those under a disability by Utah law. The 
trial court rejected appellants1 argument and held that the statute 
7/ began running when the youngest child reached majority.— Apart 
from their argument above and their argument on severability of 
the respondents1 interests, appellants suggest no other period 
J3/ See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 U. 108, 66 P.773, and Dignan v. 
Nelson, 26 U. 186, 72 P. 936 (1903). 
7/ Decision, dated January 2, 1976, page 2. 
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to begin the running and thus fail to carry tjieir burden. 
Appellants argued to the trial court that it should 
sever the interests of each of the respondents and begin the per-
iod running against each of them as they reached majority. For 
the respondents participating in this appeal, that argumentf even 
if accepted, has no bearing since Franklin Rieed, oldest of the 
participants in this appeal, reached majority on October 7f 1967 
(Stip. p. 5). The statute would not run and foreclose his action 
until October 7, 1973. However, the respondents' claim was asserted 
on February 22, 1973, in advance of that tim0. The argument that 
the respondents1 action was not "commenced" Until the counter-
claim was filed in 1974, ignores the provision of Rule 15, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure: 
11
 (c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the 
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleading, the amendment relates back 
to the date of the original pleading." 
In as much as respondents were granted leave to file an amended 
answer and counter-claim and since their original answer contained 
an assertion of the validity of the mortgage and lien, the amend-
ment arose out of the original pleading and related back. 
Appellants1 argument on this point, however, is 
without merit. The mortgage was created to secure the indebted-
ness which arose when the respondents1 trust funds were used by 
their mother. It was given in favor of the respondents collectively 
and recited one amount due. To hold that this mortgage was sever-
able would mean, theoretically, that as each of the respondents 
reached majority they could make demand upon their mother for their 
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share of the indebtedness and, assuming a failure of payment, would 
then sue for foreclosure. This could mean that possibly seven 
separate foreclosures would be necessary; it could mean that at 
the time the oldest reached majority the subject property may 
not have had a value which would compensate all the respondents and 
therefore each share of the indebtedness would be smaller; this 
would require counsel for seven individuals (the court having to 
appoint counsel for the remaining minors); ifi net effect, it would 
mean judicial re-writing of the mortgage itself. This end is not 
reasonable and the trial court so held. In determining whether 
or not to partition an estate, the court must look at the con-
sequences to the beneficiaries. For example, In re Vorhees' 
Estate, 12 U.2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961), where partition would 
mean prejudicing one of the beneficiaries, it was disallowed. 
In this case, the one clear point in time whe it is certain that 
all of the respondents' are not under a disability and when all 
of the consequences above can be avoided is when the youngest 
8/ 
of the respondents reaches majority.— Under this construction, 
the respondents1 action was certainly timely commenced. 
In summary, respondents had a valid mortgage on 
the subject property and had properly recorded it (or, rather, 
it was recorded on their behalf). Within a permissible time 
after reaching majority they brought action on the indebtedness 
and for foreclosure. Appellants clearly had notice of the mort-
gage and notice that it secured repayment of trust funds. Appel-
lants have shown no reason why the mortgage should not be fore-
closed to satisfy respondents1 judgment. 
JS/ Lawaan Kay Reed reached majority on June 15, 197d (Stip. p. 5). 
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C. The trial court properly determined the amount 
to which respondents were entitled and property ordered fore-
closure to satisfy same. As discussed above, page 8, the appel-
lents1 argument on severability is without merit. However, they 
also argue that even if the mortgage is to be foreclosed, only 
4/7ths of the amount of the judgment should b& allowed to fore-
close. This argument is apparently based upon the contention 
that the default of the three oldest Reed children in answering 
and defending their action should act to terminate said childrens' 
interest in the mortgage. As previously discussed, the mortgage 
was not severable and since the statute of 1imitations did not 
commence running until the youngest child reached majority, all 
interests thereunder remain preserved. Whether the respondents 
in this appeal hold the judgment as constructive trustees for 
their older brothers or whether those older brothers have any 
claim to the proceeds at all is not a matter tor this appeal and 
is of no concern to appellants. The simple fact is that their 
default allowed the appellants to gain by default from them what 
appellants won by judgment from respondents herein: namely, 
quiet title to the land subject to the mortgage. 
Appellants cite in support of their argument on 
severability the case of Baker v. Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P. 
117. That case, however, dealt with the adveirse possession of 
land and the court held that the interest of the parties who had 
reached their majority were barred from contesting the adverse 
possession. Of course, in that case each parity could bring an 
action to preserve his title against an advertse possessor. In 
this case, however, the claim which the appellants wish to bar 
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was founded upon the written instrument, the mortgage. As discussed 
previously, it is not reasonable to require the oldest Reed child-
ren to bring a foreclosure action prior to the majority of their 
younger siblings. Since it was not severable and since none of 
the interests had been barred by laches or limitations, all in-
terests under the mortgage remain outstanding and due and the trial 
court properly awarded judgment based upon the evidence that none 
of the indebtedness which the mortgage securred had been satis-
fied. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUIETING TITLE TO THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY IN APPELLANT HENRY H. FORRER AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD REVERSE THAT DECISION AND AWARD THE OWNERSHIP 
OF SAID PROPERTY TO RESPONDENTS. 
A. The unrecorded Quit-Claim deeds from Charles 
and Ezilda Henricks to the respondents, executed and delivered 
sometime during the year 1959, operated to vest title in sub-
ject property in the respondents. The appellants stipulated 
that the deeds were executed and delivered but not recorded 
(Stip. p. 3-4). At that time, the respondents were all minors 
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 
notified the court (Fourth Judicial District, Uintah County, 
Case No. 1458) accordingly (Stip. p. 4). Prior to the execution 
and delivery of the deeds, Ezilda Hendricks had been appointed 
guardian of the respondents (Stip. p. 3). Since the ownership 
interest held by Ezilda Hendricks to the subject property could 
be conveyed (see discussion supra, pages 3 -4) by the evidence 
in the record that interest was conveyed to the respondents. 
The question pertinent to this court really is whether or not 
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the respondents' title to, subject property could be divested by 
Ezilda Hendricks1 subsequent conveyance of the property to the 
appellant Sather and his successor in interest, Henry Forrer, both 
of whom admittedly had no actual knowledge of the conveyance to 
the respondents. 
B. The subject property was pftrt of the respondents' 
estate in the guardianship action and could npt be sold or conveyed 
without court approval. 39 AraJur2d §125, Guardian and Ward, states 
the general rule that a guardian has no authority to convey a wards' 
real estate without court approval unless authorized to do so by 
statute (at 101). Utah law is in accord with that rule [§74-13-
33, Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.)] and iln Andrus v. Blazzard, 
23 U. 233, 63 P. 888 (1901), held that neither the guardian nor 
the court has the power to bind a ward's estate unless expressly 
authorized by law to do so. Further, it is the general rule that 
a ward has a right to reclaim "...property wrongfully disposed of 
by the guardian...[from]...third parties who knew or should have 
known that, for some other reason, the disposition of the pro-
perty by the guardian was wrongful." 39 AmJur2d §217, Guardian 
and Ward, at 165. Utah courts have allowed Such recovery [See, 
Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha v. Bragg4 67 U. 60, 245 P. 966 
(1925); Andrus v. Blazzard and Gappmayer v. t|7ilkerson, infra. ] . 
The property does not appear as an asset in guardianship and there 
is no indication that the court approved or disapproved of the 
sale (Stip. p.5). Respondents clearly owned the land and without 
court approval, the sale to appellants could not operate to divest 
their title and they may now assert that title. The remaining question 
-12-
i s whether or not the respondents are now barred based upon laches , 
f a i l u r e to record or s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , from a s s e r t i n g t h e i r 
t i t l e to subject p roper ty . 
C. Neither laches nor f a i l u r e to record t h e i r i n -
t e r e s t s under the Quit-Claim deed operate to bar respondents ' 
a s se r t i ng t i t l e to the subject property aga ins t a p p e l l a n t s . 
As discussed above (supra, page 4 f f ) , the t r i a l court considered 
and re jec ted the argument t h a t the lapse of t ime, in and of i t -
se l f , should bar a s s e r t i o n of the respondents ' i n t e r e s t . That 
decis ion was founded upon the respondents ' minor i ty . Fur ther , 
with regard to t h i s i s sue of recovery of the land, i t must be 
repeated t h a t the appe l l an t s introduced no evidence which would 
support the c o u r t ' s ru l ing in t h e i r favor. 
Unquestionably, a recorded deed takes p r i o r i t y 
over an unrecorded deed under Utah law [§57-3-2, Utah Code An-
notated (1953 r e v . e d . ) ] . A c r i t i c a l element of t h a t p r i o r i t y , 
however, i s t h a t the holder of the recorded deed must have taken 
i t as a bona f ide purchaser without ac tua l or implied not ice of 
the other i n t e r e s t s claimed. Thus, the Utah court sa id in 
Gappmayer v, Wilkenson, 53 U. 236, 177 P. 763 (1918), a t 245: 
ff
...[T]he circumstances surrounding the 
entire transaction were such that the de-
fendants Wilkenson must have had knowledge 
that the children, the plaintiffs in this 
action, being nephews and nieces of the 
defendant Nelson and the children of Gapp-
meyer, who assisted in the negotiations, 
had an interest in the premises, and that 
the defendants Wilkenson, in taking t i t l e 
with that knowledge, took i t subject to 
any equities or interests that the plain-
tiffs may have had in said premises." 
In t h a t case , the fa ther of the defendant minor ch i ldren had 
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executed and -delivered deeds to certain property to an escrow 
agent but later retrieved these deeds which were never recorded. 
Subsequently a deed from the father to Nelson and a deed from 
Nelson to Wilkenson were recorded.—' From the record in this case, 
the appellants unquestionably had recorded notice that there was 
a trust relationship between their predecessor in interest 
(Ezilda Hendricks) and the respondents. The mortgage itself 
revealed that it securred the investment of ttust funds. Fur-
ther, the guardianship proceedings were a matter of record in 
Uintah County, the county in which subject property was located. 
Certainly under these circumstances a prudent purchaser would 
examine the transaction carefully to insure tKiat there were no 
claims such as respondentsf which could be asserted against him 
despite a clear "recorded" title. Recorded transactions only 
create a presumption of propriety which presumption can be over-
come by evidence to the contrary [see, ControjLled Receivables, Inc. 
v. Harman, 17 U2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966)]. Because of (1) the 
knowledge (actual) that the respondents had at least a mortgage interest 
the property; (2) the knowledge (actual) that the respondents 
may be minors; (3) the recorded, prior guardianship proceedings; 
and (4) the knowledge (actual) that the respondents and their 
mother were part-Indian and therefore a Federal trust relation-
ship existed, the appellants should not now be allowed to claim 
surprise at learning of the respondents1 unrecorded, but valid title 
to the subject property. 
Perhaps an even stronger argument to appellants1 
claim is seen in the actions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
9/ See, also, Bumham, et.al. v. Eschler, 116 U. 61, 208 P.2d 96 (1949). 
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It is stipulated that because the respondents' mother and step-
father has wrongfully disposed of some of respondents' property, 
the BIA felt the respondents needed more security for their 
previously advanced trust funds, it insisted upon the execution 
of the Quit-Claim deeds in favor of respondents and notified the 
court in the guardianship proceeding accordingly (Stip. p. 3-4). 
The BIA obviously felt that it had done all that was necessary 
to protect respondents1 interests since it knew that property 
of wards could not be disposed of without court order and it 
had notified the court of their interests. Further, it obviously 
felt that the Quit-Claim deeds would be recorded and hence the 
respondents further protected. One purpose of stare decisis 
is to guide citizens in the conduct of their affairs and their 
expectations should not be frustrated absent strong considerations 
of public policy.—' While it might have followed-up to insure 
that the deeds were recorded, the BIA certainly provided suf-
ficient notice of the respondentsf interests that its expecta-
tions should not be frustrated. This is expecially so consider-
ing the weight of recorded information available to appellants 
which would reveal the respondents1 interests. Again, the res-
pondents were not only minors but also wards of the government 
(Stip. p. 2) and the records maintained by the BIA regarding 
their affairs were part of the Federal chain of title which the 
appellants were bound to examine for their own protection. 
10/ See, e.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan,344 Pa. 556, 25 A2d. 
728, 729. 
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D. The respondents are not barred by reason of 
expiration of the statute of limitations from asserting their 
title to subject property against appellants. It must be re-
emphasized that appellants have argued for application of § 78-
12-18 to all aspects of this case. That section applies in the 
context of this claim for recovery of estates where it does not 
apply with regard to the foreclosure of the mortgage. However, 
the argument heretofore made regarding the running of periods 
of limitations is equally applicable here: thfe statute commenced 
running when the youngest of the children reaphed majority. As 
previously noted (supra, p.8,n.8) the youngest child reached 
majority on June 15, 1970. Thus the statute would commence run-
ning from that point and would expire on June 15, 1973. The 
action having been commenced in February of 1|973, the statute 
was tolled. Further, it makes no more sense to sever the interest 
under the deeds than it does the interest under the mortgage. In 
fact, the first point at which the respondents could have become 
aware of the appellants' adverse interest in the property was 
on May 8, 1969, when the court quieted title in the subject pro-
perty in the appellants as against Ezilda Hendricks by deciding 
"no cause of action" on her complaint.— Certainly the respond-
ents who were of age at the time of that action would be lulled 
into believing that since she was still the guardian for their 
brothers and sisters her action would preserve their interests, 
especially since she alleged that the sale was, in fact, a loan. 
11/ That action is referred to in the stipulation (Stip. p. 2) and 
is captioned: Ezelda [sic] Reed Hendricks v. Robert Sather, dba Sather 
Jewelry and Richard Murray, Fourth Judicial District bourt of Uintah County, 
Civil No. 5257. 
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POINT III 
RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY FEES AS PART OF THEIR JUDGMENT AND THIS 
COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND WITH INSTRUCTION 
TO DETERMINE AND AWARD SAME. 
A. The mortgage provided for attorney fees in 
the event of default/ only the amount thereof being left un-
specified and it was unreasonable to interpret that provision 
as barring assessment of attorney fees. Under Utah law, the 
court must determine and assess "reasonable" attorney fees in 
foreclosure actions [§78-37-9/ Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.)]. 
In as much as it has been held that the court must make this 
12/ determination independently of any contracted for amount— the 
failure to specify a sum certain for attorney fees should not 
bar their award. Again, since the court must determine "reason-
able" attorney feesf it should not be necessary to include that 
word; it is read-in as a matter of law of mortgages. If the 
parties had not intended to provide for attorney fees, it is 
a more reasonable interpretation that they would strike any re-
ference to attorney fees instead of just leaving the amount blank. 
13/ The attorney fees are a lien upon the mortgaged premises—' and 
should therefore be included in the order of foreclosure. Tn as 
much as the mortgagors occupied a trust relationship with the mort-
gagees, the document should be strictly construed against the mort-
gagors. The Trial Court not having determined fees, this court 
should remand with instructions to calculate the amount of attorney 
fees, including fees and costs of this appeal, and award same. 
JL2/ See, Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915); See, 
also, F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 U2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 ( ). 
13/ Jensen v. Lichtenstein, supra, n.12. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, respondents 
urge this court to affirm the trial court's decision awarding 
respondents a judgment and order of sale of tfye subject property. 
Provided, however, respondents urge this court to reverse the 
trial court's decision denying respondents their attorney fees 
and to remand the case to the trial court for determination of 
attorney fees due respondents for all aspects of this case, in-
cluding this appeal, and for further instructions to enter judg-
ment in the amount as determined by the trial court and for in-
clusion of that amount in the decree of foreclosure and order 
of sale. 
Alternatively, respondents urge this court to 
reverse the trial court's decision quieting title to subject 
property in appellants and to remand this cast to the trial court 
with instructions to quiet title in the subject property in the 
respondents and to enter judgment in their favor for their attorney 
fees and costs incurred in this action, including this appeal. 
Respectfujlly submitted, 
R. CLARK ARNOLD 
Attorney for Franklin Reed, 
Margaret Reed, Cordie Mae 
Reed and Lawanna Kay Reed. 
Defendants-Counter-Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
922 Kearnls Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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